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This paper analyzes the effect of access to different types of food outlets on 
households’ food insecurity levels.  Two years (2004 and 2005) of Current Population Survey 
– Food Security Supplement data are matched with MSA-level data on store counts of Wal-
Mart Supercenters, small food stores (small grocery stores and convenience stores), medium 
and large grocery stores, and convenience stores associated with gas stations.  Endogeneity of 
food stores’ location is accounted for to eliminate spurious correlation between households’ 
food security status and food access, using the 2-State Residual Inclusion method (2-SRI).  
Preliminary results indicate that, before accounting for endogeneity bias, the presence of Wal-
Mart supercenters appears to be associated to higher levels of households’ food insecurity, 
while the presence of other food stores is associated with lower levels.  After eliminating 
spurious correlation, only the presence of small food stores appears helping to reduce food 
insecurity (across measures of food insecurity and data samples) while the presence of gas 
convenience stores is associated with higher likelihoods of experiencing food insecurity.  The 
presence of Wal-Mart supercenters and that of medium and large grocery stores have little to 
no impact on the likelihood of a household being food insecure (the first showing only weak 
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Food Access and Food Insecurity – Some Preliminary Findings 
1.  Introduction 
Food insecurity is the outcome of a household being unable to acquire (or being 
uncertain of having) enough food to meet the needs of all its members (Nord et al., 2010).  
Due to the most recent economic downturn, recent estimates of households’ food insecurity 
(FI) in the United States have reached worrisome levels.  According to USDA estimates, at 
some point during the year 2009 there were 17.4 million (14.7%) households affected by FI.  
Of these, 10.6 million (9.0 %) were characterized as Low Food Secure (LFS) households and 
6.8 million (5.7 %) as Very Low Food Secure (VLFS) households.
1  Even though these values 
were substantially unchanged from those of the previous year, such figures are considerably 
larger than those of one decade ago: in the year 1999 there were 10.1% FI households of 
which 7.1 % were LFS and 3.0 % VLFS (Nord et al,, 2010). 
Although several studies have analyzed the characteristics of food secure households 
(see for example Rose, Gundersen and Oliveira, 1998; Nord, Andrews and Carlson, 2004; 
Nord et al, 2010), and many more have analyzed FI in the context of the effectiveness of food 
assistance programs (e.g.  Gundersen and Oliveira, 2001; Jensen, 2002; Borjas, 2004; 
Kabbani and Kmeid, 2005; Bartfeld and Dunifon, 2006; Gibson-David and Foster, 2006; Yen 
et al. 2008; Nord and Golla, 2009), few attempts exists aiming to understand the relationship 
between household’s FI status and the surrounding environment.
2 
                                                
1 Low Food Secure households have obtained enough food to avoid substantially disruption in 
their eating patterns or reduced food intake by using a variety of coping strategies, such as 
eating less varied diets, participating in Federal food assistance programs, or getting 
emergency food from community food pantries. These households were previously described 
as “food insecure without hunger.”  Very Low Food Secure households are affected by 
disruption of normal eating patterns of one or more household members. Food intake was 
reduced at times during the year because they had insufficient money or other resources for 
food.  These households were described as “food insecure with hunger.” 
2 See for example Bartfeld and Dunifon (2006) analysis of State-level contextual (economic 
and social) attributes on the likelihood of food security among households with children.   3 
Even though the relationship between food security and the food environment has 
been widely acknowledged,
3 no empirical analysis has rigorously treated the issue and tried to 
qualify and quantify the potential impact of the access to different outlets on the likelihood of 
being food insecure.  As causes of food FI are associated with having insufficient income or 
limited access to other sources of food that do not require expenses (e.g. food pantries, food 
banks etc...), access to sources where to retrieve food has a pivotal role in ensuring that 
households have (at least potentially), the ability to be food secure.  The presence of food 
stores can affect FI on two fronts.  First, in the presence of limited access, consumers may be 
charged higher prices as retailers may benefit from monopolistic positions.  Second, lack of 
transportation means may prevent low-income households to reach the most convenient 
option to them (if such option is available), making it hard to adopt cost-saving strategies 
(Leibtag and Kaufman, 2003).
 4  Not understanding the effect of the food environments on FI 
may limit the accuracy of policy analysis that would contemplate tools geared to improve 
food access.
5  
Furthermore, some of the recent structural changes of the food retailing industry 
(Martinez, 2007) may result in favorable outcomes for low-income households.  One of the 
most important recent changes in food retailing is Wal-Mart’s expansion of its Supercenters
6 
                                                
3 Several programs exist both at the national and aiming to improve food security through 
food access.  For example, following the passage of the Community Food Security Act in 
1996, the USDA launched the Community Food Security Initiative in 1999 to help 
establishing partnerships between USDA and local communities, (Scott Kantor, 2001).  
4 A vast body of descriptive and/or limited scope analysis shows that areas inhabited by a 
prevalence of less-privileged individuals are characterized by limited access to large (or “high 
quality”) food stores (see for example Alwitt and Donley, 1997; Ball et. al., 2008; Cotterill 
and Franklin, 1995; Morland et al., 2002; King et al. 2004; Moore and Diez Roux, 2006; 
Powell et al., 2007; Zenk et al., 2005).Furthermore, a positive relationship exists between the 
quality of the food choices that low-income (food stamps recipient) households make and the 
access to food outlets (Rose and Richards, 2004). 
5 See for example the attempts, in Maryland, to ease tax pressure on grocery stores located in 
low-income areas (Beherens, 2010). 
6 The company has moved away from its Discount Stores format (carrying a limited number 
of food products, mostly shelf-stable) to the Supercenter format, which offers fresh produce, 
meat, bakery, deli and fresh seafood departments, becoming the larger food retailer n the U.S.   4 
format.  Such expansion can be beneficial to low-income’s households ability to acquire food 
for two reasons: 1) the company has been found to increase consumers’ surplus by offering 
lower prices and greater product variety (Hausman and Leibtag, 2007) providing relief to low-
income individuals giving access to fresh produce at lower prices (Volpe and Lavoie 2008, 
Basker and Noel, 2009); 2) as Wal-Mart locates its stores preferentially in areas where 
competition is scant (Jia, 2008; Bonanno, 2010), its expansion could improve food access for 
low-income households who may have limited access otherwise.  However, as the company 
may preferentially locate its stores in areas characterized by higher percentages of low income 
individuals
7 isolating casual effect between Wal-Mart Supercenters’ presence and likelihood 
of being food insecure requires controlling for the company’s endogenous location decision.   
Spurious correlation is an issue that should be accounted for in order to evaluate the 
impact of any type of food outlets on the households’ food security levels, since both 
consumers and market characteristics affect retailers’ location decision.  In fact, retailers 
position themselves endogenously into a fringe of low quality stores serving consumers who 
cannot (due to income constraint) pay for quality, and another tier of high quality stores 
(Ellickson, 2005; 2007), offering higher prices and a higher level of services (Bonanno and 
Lopez, 2009).  In sum, as demographic characteristics impact location decision and outcomes 
such as FI, and the likelihood of the presence of unobservables impacting both processes is 
high, accounting for location endogeneity becomes indispensable.   
This analysis aims to investigate whether having access to food retailers of different 
types, can affect a household’s FI status, and whether such effects are larger for low-income 
households.  Household-level  data on households’ FI status come from the Current 
Population Survey – Food Security Supplement (CPS-FSS) for the years 2004 and 2005, 
                                                                                                                                                   
(Food Marketing Institute, 2007).  As of January 31 2011, Wal-Mart operated (in the U.S. 
alone) 2,747 Supercenters and 803 Discount Stores (Wal-Mart Stores Inc, 2010). 
7 The a rate of conversion of Discount Stores into Supercenters, representing the main strategy 
followed by the company to expand into food retailing is positively related with higher 
percentages of population being food stamps’ recipients (Bonanno, 2010).   5 
which are matched with food stores data at the MSA level using geography identifiers 
included in the CPS-FSS. The four types of stores considered are Wal-Mart Supercenters, 
small sized food stores (convenience stores and small groceries, proxy for easy to access 
stores, which offer limited assortments), medium-large sized grocery stores (proxy for 
traditional, full-service food stores, offering broad assortment but potentially hard to reach), 
and convenience stores attached to gas stations (stores whose location may be hard to reach 
and that offer only a limited assortment of food products).  Our proxies for food access are the 
MSA-level number of stores of the four types divided by population.  We control for food 
stores’ location endogeneity using identification strategies that capture geographic differences 
in the supply-side determinants of location decision.  In the specific case of Wal-Mart 
Supercenters, the identification strategy uses lagged density of discount stores (as in Basker 
and Noal, 2009) and the distance from the company’s food distribution centers (Bonanno, 
2010) as predictors of the density of Supercenters, while for the other food outlets we use 
geographic variations of cost variables across the different store-types.  
Preliminary results show that, after correcting for store location endogeneity, only the 
presence of small food stores appears to help reducing FI (across measures of food insecurity 
and samples) while the presence of gas convenience stores is associated with higher 
likelihoods of experiencing FI. The presence of Wal-Mart supercenters and that of medium 
and large grocery stores have little to no impact on the likelihood of a household being food 
insecure (the first showing only weak evidence of a mitigating effect, the second, instead, 
showing weak evidence of a magnifying effect).  
 
2.  An Empirical Model of Food Insecurity and Food Access 
The following model is a stylized representation of FI as the outcome of a household`s 
optimization problem.  Household i located in area l maximizes its utility, which is function of 
income (spent on goods) and leisure (or hours worked), subject to time and budget   6 
constraints.  Although the formal derivation is not illustrated here, the interested reader can 
refer to Jensen (2002) for a thorough discussion.  In Jensen’s model, (which does not account 
for the role of the built environment, but considers instead participation in the Food Stamp 
Program, as a household’s decision variable) FI causes disutility due to concerns about having 
an adequate food supply, and under-consumption of food for some of household members.  In 
the context of this analysis, the household FI status will depend upon both the household’s 
characteristics and the features of the environment they live in.  Thus, the FI status of 
household i in area l, or FIil will be represented by the following function:  
( , , | , , ) ( | ) il il l l il il FI f X FA d e f Z e b d g q = + = +        (1)  
Where Xil is a vector of household characteristics, FAl is a proxy capturing the level of access 
to food for all households in area l (measured by the number of outlets of a given store type Nj 
divided by the total population in area l or Nj /popl), dl is a vector of fixed effects to control 
for unobservables factors that could impact FI, β, δ, and γ are vectors of parameters 
conformable to Xil , FAl , and dl, respectively, and eil is an error term.  The first part of the 
central term in equation (1) can be summarized as  ( | ) f Z q where Z is the vector of all the 
variables that can influence FI and θ a conformable vector of parameters characterizing the 
relationship between the covariates in Z and FIil.  
Let h be a realization of FIij , i.e. a FI state; the probability that status h is observed is:  
1 Pr( | ) Pr il h k kil j jl s s il h
k s
FI h Z X FA d e l b d g l +
 
= = < + + + <  
  ∑ ∑    (2)  
hihc, Considering three possible states for FI (Food Secure, Low Food Secure, and Very Low 
Food Secure); i.e.  h = {0,1,2}.  In this case, the probability of observing a given realization of 
h is:  
Pr(FIil =h| Z) = L (λ h  – Z ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢θ ) – L (λ h+1  – Z ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢θ);       (3)  
where  λ 0 = –∞,  λ 3 = +∞ and  L(.) is the logistic cumulative density function (CDF).  If Z is 
uncorrelated with the error terms, the vector of coefficients θ can be estimated be via   7 
maximum likelihood, using an ordered logit estimator, and the estimates obtained will be 
unbiased and consistent.  
However, endogeneity bias is likely to be present.
 8 From a theoretical standpoint, food 
retailers play a generic two-stage game (à la Sutton, 1998), where, in the first stage, they 
decide where to locate (the investment stage) while in a second stage they compete with other 
incumbent firms in the market (the competition stage).  Given the intricate and complex 
nature of such game, which is dynamic in nature since firms maximize expected profits, there 
are infinite possible equilibria whose detailed analysis is a daunting task.
9    
Using the simiplifying assumptions that food retail companies have limited ability to 
choose their store formats
10  (i.e. that the product-type offered by each retailer is given) and 
that, in a given area and for each establishment type, food retail firms (facing symmetric 
demand and cost) can be ordered by decreasing profitability (i.e. the most profitable firms 
enter the market first, as in Berry, 1992),
11 there exists a Nash equilibrium (although not 
unique), which allows the researcher to treat the observed number of market participants as 
one of the possible equilibria of a game played by all potential entrants. 
Let the observed number of food retail outlets of type j in area l, 
*
jl N , be one possible 
equilibrium outcome of the location game discussed above.  As, in general terms, larger 
markets could support a larger equilibrium number of firms, and market size impacts 
differently the equilibrium of different types of firms (Sutton, 1998), market size could  
become a limiting factor for firms investing heavily in fixed cost, which applies to most of 
                                                
8 Traditional models of firm’s location consider firms‘ location to occurr along a continuum 
of possible outcomes. Some industry will be mostly supply-oriented, (e.g., coal mines), others  
demand oriented (e.g. family doctor practices), while others will p[ay attention to both supply 
and demadn factoers, such as retailers.  See Kilkenny & Thisse (1999) for a review. 
9  See Jia (2008) for a formal analysis of a dynamic location game by retail firms.  
10 Strictly speaking, retail firms present different formats (making them differentiated 
products). Including the format-type decision in the game, will complicate the analysis further 
(see for example Mazzeo, 2002; or Seim, 2006). 
11 This assumption is consistent with those of seminal models of firms’ entry (e.g. Bresnahan 
and Reiss, 1991; Berry, 1992)   8 
traditional food stores (Ellickson, 2006).
12  Assuming that, in area l, market size is a 
proportion of the population (popl)
13, let’s consider the following reduced form equation 
representing the equilibrium measure of store density for store-type j in area l: 
*
( , ; ) ( , ; )
jl D D C C
jl jl j jl jl j jl
l
N
g g C K
Pop
a a e - = + + X X         (4)  
where the (.)
D g  and  (.)
C g  are functions representing, respectively, the role of demand and 
cost factors on the equilibrium store density levels; Xjl and X-jl are vectors of demand 
characteristics in area l (both for the j-th store type and for that of other store-types)
14; Cjl and 
Kjl are vectors of format- and market- specific cost variables (variable and fixed cost, 
respectively), the 
D
j a  and 
C
j a are conformable vectors of parameters qualifying the 
relationship between demand and cost factors (respectively) and store density, and  jl e is an 









º , unless one controls for all demand-side factors impacting both FIil 
and FAjl, the likelihood that, in equation (2) FAjl is correlated with  il e is high.  However, if the 
cost variables Cjl and Kjl  are truly exogenous, and if the source of correlation of FAjl and  il e is 
exclusively due to the presence of the term  ( , ; )
D D
jl jl j g a - X X , that is,  ( ) 0, , , jl il E e i j l e = "  the 
presence of spurious correlation in equation (2) can be easily resolved.   
Rewriting equation (4) as  
                                                
12 Such considerations apply to most industries whose firms commit to a specific location.  
Asplund    and  Sandin  (1999)  point  out  in  their  analyses  of  Swedish  regional  markets  for 
driving schools, as profits per capita decrease in market size, capacity will tend to impose a 
limit to the possibility of observing a higher number of equilibrium firms. 
13 As market size, representing the potential demand for the goods offered by the firm j is a 
function of market characteristics such proportion is  not a constant but depends  on other 
factors  such  as  income  and  consumers’  heterogeneity  which,  in  equation  (4)  below  are 
represented by the vectors Xj and X-j. See Asplund and Sandin (1999) for more details. 
14 Demand characteristics across store types enter equation (4) because in the second stage of 
the game firms are likely to compete with those of other formats.   9 
*
( , ; )
jl C C
jl jl j jl
l
N
g C K r
Pop
a = +            (5) 
where the term  ( , ; )
D D
jl jl jl j jl r g a e - = + X X  is by construction, correlated with the errors in 
equation (2).  It is easy to show that, if one introduced  jl r  (or an unbiased estimate of it) in 
equation (2) the source of correlation between FAjl  and  il e will be accounted for in the model 
and the new resulting error term uncorrelated with FAjl.  Thus, let  ˆjl r  be the errors obtained 
from a first-stage linear regression of the j-th FA indicator on relevant cost variables:   
*
ˆ ˆ ( , )'
jl C





a = +               (6) 
The model in equation (2) can then be rewritten as follows:  
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 ˆ Pr( | ) Pr
SRI SRI SRI r SRI SRI SRI
il h k kil j jl j jl s s il h
k s
FI h Z X FA r d e l b d d g l +
 
= = < + + + + <  
  ∑ ∑   (7)  
which, under the assumptions in (3),can be estimated via Ordered Logit.   
The approach illustrated above, the 2-Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) method, is 
superior to classical 2-stage instrumental variable methods in non-linear models such Ordered 
logit. Terza, Basu, and Rathouz (2008) show that, while classical “2-stage” approaches can 
produce inconsistent estimates, the 2SRI method produces unbiased and consistent estimates 
for a broad family of non-linear estimators.  Application of such method can be found in 
several areas such as policy analysis (Alvarez and Glasgow, 1999), health economics (see for 
example Terza, Basu, and Rathouz; 2008) and marketing (Petrin and Train, 2010).  
 
3.  Data and Estiamtion   
3.1.  Data Sources and Variable Definitions 
The database used in the estimation is obtained combining different data sources. Data 
on households’ FI status and their characteristics come from two years of individual-level   10 
observations of the Current Population Survey -Food Security Supplement (CPS-FSS) of the 
U.S. Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics, December 2004 and 2005.
15     
The CPS-FSS reports different measured of household FI.  The survey respondents are 
asked a series of eighteen questions related to the availability of food in their household, 
including limitations in food consumptions and the number of meals skipped, distinguishing 
for disruptions in eating habits for both adults and children in the households.  In base of the 
household’s responses to these questions (or to a subset of it) “raw” FI indicators are 
constructed and then manipulated to obtain Rasch-based scores which are then coded to 
obtain discrete FI indicators.
16  The indicators used in this analysis are the households’ “Food 
security summary status, 12-month” and “Food security summary status, 30-day,” referred to 
as FI-12m and FI-30d, respectively.  The categories chosen as statuses of FI are Food Secure 
(FI = 0), which includes High and Marginal Food Security statues (FS); Low Food Security 
(LFS;  FI = 1), and Very Low Food Security (VLFS; FI = 2). 
While the public access files of the CPS-FSS do not disclose the exact location of the 
individuals’ surveyed, most observations have state and MSA-code identifiers attached to 
them, which allows the CPS-FSS data to be matched with other, market level databases.  Only 
observations presenting valid entries of both FI indicators and geographic indicators are 
retained in the database.   
Data on traditional food retailers’ location were obtained from the County Business 
Pattern (CBP) of the U.S. Census Bureau/Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  The industries 
considered are NAICS 445110: Grocery Stores; NAICS 445120, Convenience Stores, and 
                                                
15 The choice of using the years 2004 and 2005 was made on two grounds.  First, as the CPS-
FSS had to be matched to MSA-level data coming from other sources, and MSA definitions 
changed across years and across databases, the data for the years 2004 and 2005 allowed for a 
perfect match with other MSA-level data.  Second, as data on Wal-Mart supercenters location 
is only available until January 2006, through T. J. Homes Store location database (Holmes, 
2010), no subsequent years were used.  
16 The illustration of how the Food Security indicators are obtained from the original eighteen 
measures collected is not immediate and it is left out for brevity. See Nord (2002) for more  
details.    11 
NAICS 447110, Convenience stores with Gas Station.  Data on Wal-Mart Supercenters’ 
stores number and location are obtained from T. J. Holmes database (Holmes, 2010).  County-
level CBP data and the Wal-Mart data were aggregated to the MSA level to match the 
geographic indicators of the CPS-FSS.
17 
Using the information on the number of employees contained in the CBP, grocery 
stores’ establishments with less than 50 employees are combined with the number of 
establishments belonging to NAICS 445120 to obtain a proxy of the number of small 
(proximity / low assortment) food stores; the food access measure SMALL is then obtained 
divided this number by total population (in tens of thousands), obtained from the Population 
Estimates Program (PEP).  A proxy for access to supermarkets and other traditional food 
outlets defined GROC, is obtained dividing the number of NAICS 445120 establishment with 
50 or more employees by MSA-level population in hundreds of thousands (PEP); the variable 
GSCNV, a proxy for access to outlets characterized by limited accessibility (as for cars are 
necessary) and assortments is obtained dividing the number of NAICS 447110 establishments 
by population in hundreds of thousands.  Lastly the variable WMSC is obtained dividing the 
aggregated, MSA-level number of Wal-Mart Supercenters by population in millions.  
Household-level variables from the CPS-FSS survey are used to control for 
household’s characteristic: age of the household head (AGE), number of children in the 
household (CHILD), highest education level in household (three binary variables indicating, 
respectively High-School, HIGHSC; Some College, SOMCOL and Bachelor degree or more, 
COLMOR), gender of the household head (GEND: 1=Male, 0=Female), and a series of binary 
variables accounting for race of the household head (Black, Asian and Hispanic, respectively), 
home ownership (HMOWN), single-head household (SINGLEH), unitary household 
(SINGLUN), and for the presence of any non-citizens (NOCITIZ), unemployed (UNEMPL) 
                                                
17 CBP data at the MSA –level could not be directly used due to discrepancies in some of the 
classifications across the two databases.   12 
and disabled (DISABL) individuals in the household.  Interval regression on the 16-level 
household income bracket indicators in the CPS, on a series of demographic predictors and 
variables assessing type of employment, is used to obtain a proxy for the income level of the 
household adjusted by household size. Such proxy (INC_PR) was dividing the predicted value 
from the interval regression by household size.
18  Lastly, state-level fixed effects are obtained 
using the state identifiers in the CPS-FSS and are included in the model to control for 
households’ unobserved heterogeneity.   
 Households showing invalid entries of the demographic variables illustrated above 
and of the 16-level household income indicators are also dropped from the database. The data 
points used in the estimation consisted of 36,887 observations (18,356 for the year 2004 and 
18,531 for 2005).  From this database, which will be referred to as the Full sample, a 
subsample including only households whose income is below the 185% of the current poverty 
threshold, referred to as the low income (Low-Inc) sample.  The number of observations for 
this sample is 7,487 (3,817 for the year 2004 and 3,670 for 2005).  
Summary statistics for the FI indicators and the FA variables for the different years 
and different subsamples are reported in Table 1.  The values show that, as expected, the 
percentages of FI households are much larger in the low-income sample than in the full 
sample.  In particular, 27.41 % of the households in the Low-Inc sample experienced FI in the 
12-months prior to the survey (18.45 % LFS and 8.96 % VLFS) vs. 9.51 in the full sample 
                                                
18 The variables used in the regression to predict household income are the demographic 
indicators described in the main text, indicators for the head’s employment (civil 
employment, part-time and full-time employment, number of hours worked), and different 
size of the areas where they live in. State-level fixed effects are also used. Borrowing from 
Cameron (1988) and Cameron and Huppert (1989), we model the probability of household 
income being between two thresholds represented by two consecutive levels of the 16-
brackets household income indicator in the CPS, can be represented by the difference of two 
standard normal CDFs (after appropriate standardization of the intervals), and that the 
relationship between income and the covariates is linear.  The model is estimated using 
Maximum Likelihood assuming log-normality of the errors to ensure only positive income 
values. The predicted values where then converted in levels and divided by number of 
individuals in the household, obtaining the variable INC_PR.    13 
(6.48 % LFS and 3.03 % VLFS) while more modest percentages are recorded for Fi 
occurrences in the 30 days prior to the survey.  The FA variables show a picture consistent 
with the evidence that Wal-Mart tends to locate its food stores preferentially in areas where 
there may be a higher concentration of low-income individuals, since the average number of 
WMSC in the full sample is 10% lower than in the Low-Inc sample (2.65 vs. 3.04, 
respectively).  The sample averages for the other food stores’ density are instead relatively 
similar across full and low-income samples, although the presence of small grocery and 
convenience stores (SMALL) is 10% lower for the Low-Inc subsample.  Lastly, a list of all 
the household-level variables and summary statistics for the two samples are illustrated in the 
top half of Table 2.  
 
3.2.  Identification Strategy 
To implement the 2SRI method, one needs to find viable exogenous variables to be 
used in the first stage regressions.  The rationale behind the choice of what variables (i.e. the 
identification strategy) to use for each different FA measure is discussed below.  Although 
such variables are referred to as “instruments” the reader should be aware that the 2-SRI 
method adopted here differs from standard IV methods.  
Our strategy to account for the endogeneity of WMSCs
19 uses two facts that are based 
on the company’s unique store location strategy.  First, as the company’s expansion into food 
retailing capitalizes on converting its mass merchandize Discount Stores (DSs) into 
supercenters (see Bonanno 2010), the lagged number of DSs  is used as instrument for 
WMSCs  as it represents a good predictor of  SCs density (approach similar to that used by 
Basker and Noal, 2009).  Furthermore, as Holmes (2011) shows, another major driver of the 
                                                
19  Specifically,  Wal-Mart  Supercenters  locations  may  be  correlated  with  particular  socio-
demographic profile, which may in turn be correlated with poorer diets (e.g., high poverty 
rates, as in Goetz and Swaminathan, 2006; or share of population food stamps’ recipients as in 
Bonanno, 2010).    14 
company’s location decision is the proximity of a distribution center, allowing the company to 
capitalize from economies of density, consistently with the Hub-and-spoke logistic system of 
the company (Walton and Huey, 1992).  Thus, a weighted average of the inverse of distance 
form food distribution centers (see Bonanno, 2010, for more details), whose location is 
available in Holmes (2010) database, is used as additional instrument for the density of Wal-
Mart Supercenters.  
Our identification strategy for the non-Wal-Mart measures of food access, is based on 
the simple notion that, given the size of a market (i.e. the potential demand), food retail 
establishments would locate preferentially in areas where pre-existing infrastructures provide 
ease of transportation and implementation of logistics structure, where the price of land may 
be lower, and where the prices of operation specific (and other location-specific) costs are 
smaller. To this end, we use historical and current information on infrastructure to capture 
exogenous (to current changes in food security) variation in store-density across retailers, as 
well as store-type specific sources of costs.  To account for pre-existing infrastructures which 
could facilitate transportation and logistics operations we use the state-level miles of federal 
highways in 1950 (U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, 
1950); as small convenience and grocery stores tend to locate mostly in urban areas, the 
length of 1950 highways in Urban areas is used as instrument for SMALL, while as larger 
operations (as well as gas stations) may benefit from the capillarity of the highway system, 
the length of 1950 highways in secondary areas are used as instruments for GROG and 
GSCNV.  The proxy for land prices is the MSA-level number of vacant housing  units, from 
the 2000 Census, (U.S., Bureau of Census, 2000) divided by square miles of land, from the 
Census Gazetteer of counties (U.S. Bureau of Census, 2001).  Population density (thousands 
of individuals by square mile), is also accounted for in the first-stage regressions of the three 
non-Wal-Mart FA variables.     15 
Store-type specific cost shifters are energy prices collected from the U.S. Department 
of Energy, Energy Information Administration.  State-specific wholesale (refiner) gasoline 
price ($/gal), is used for GSCNV, annual state-level price of electricity for commercial use 
(KW/h) is used for both  SMALL and GROC, while as larger stores necessitate of more 
frequent delivery of goods and they may operate their own fleet, the “On-highway” price of 
diesel (all types) in $/gal is used as instrument for GROC.  Lastly, as some states set very low 
(as low as zero) minimum corporate tax rates to attract small businesses, the minimum 
corporate tax rate for the lowest net income level is used as additional instrument for SMALL; 
similarly, as large companies will be discouraged to operate in areas where the business tax 
rates for large operations are higher, the corporate tax rate for the highest net income level is 
used as additional instrument for GROC.  Both variables come from the Tax Foundation of 
the U.S. Bureau of Census.  A list of all the instruments used and some summary statistics are 
illustrated in the bottom half of Table 2.  
 
3.3.  Tests and estimation  
One advantage of the 2-SRI method is that the significance of the estimated coefficient 
associated with the residuals from the first-stage regression indicates whether endogeneity 
was present in the original model, following the same rationale of the classical Hausman 
(1978) test used in linear models.  However, no formal method to determine the validity of the 
instruments used for each of the FA variables in the first stage regressions exists.  In order to 
have an indication of the validity of the instruments, a linear version of the model was 
estimated via IV methods (Generalized Method of Moments – GMM) using the Rash scores 
as dependent variables and the orthogonality condition (of the instruments to the error terms) 
evaluated via Hansen’s (1982) J-tests, while Staiger and Stock (1997), rule of thumb (the 
value of an F-statistic of a test for the joint significance of the instruments exceeding 10) is 
used to establish whether the model is affected by “weak instrument” problem.      16 
In sum, two samples of data were used: one including all the households with valid FI 
entry and geographic indicators, and one including only households below 185% of the 
poverty level.  Discrete 12-month and 30-day food insecurity indicators were used as 
dependent variables.  As the correlation between the FA variables is large and most of the 
instruments used to correct for their endogeneity are at the state-level, estimating a model 
where the FA variables were used simultaneously was not feasible due to problems of 
multicollinearity. Thus, 16 models (combining each of the FI indicators with the FA 
variables) where estimated first via Ordered Logit, and, after testing for the presence of 
endogeneity bias, the models were re-estimated via 2-SRI method using the residuals of the 
first-stage regressions which adopted the set of exogenous variables illustrated above.
20  All 
data manipulation and estimation were performed in STATA v. 11.  
 
4.  Empirical Results  
4.1 OL and 2SRI-OL estimates  
The results of ordered logit estimation of equation (3) for the full sample, not 
accounting for endogeneity of the FA variables are presented in Table 3.  Generally speaking, 
the use of different FA variables does not impact the overall performance of the model (the 
pseudo R-squared show approximately the same values of 0.13, and the likelihood ratio tests 
for the joint significance of the coefficients shows similar values across models).  
The estimated coefficient for WMSC is positive (0.0150) and significant at the10% 
level, while the presence of GSCNV seem not to have an impact on the likelihood of being FI 
(its coefficient, -0.0241, is not statistically significant).  The relationship between FI and the 
                                                
20 The model was re-estimated using binary FI indicators as dependent variables, combining 
households showing LFS and VLFS status.  The results of these models, estimated via logit 
and 2-SRI/logit were virtually identical to those which will be illustrated in the main text and 
therefore excluded.  Furthermore, the use of a more flexible estimator, the generalized ordered 
logit (Williams, 2006), which relaxes the proportional odds assumption of the Ordered Logit, 
was attempted.  As convergence was in many cases impossible to achieve, the partial results 
obtained are excluded from the manuscript.   17 
density of proximity and grocery stores (SMALL and GROG) is negative and statistically 
significant (the estimated coefficients are, respectively, -0.1255 and -0.0137, both significant 
at the 1%).  If such results were unbiased they would indicate that a higher concentration of 
WMSCs would increase the likelihood of being FI while that of traditional food stores would 
decrease it.  In sum, in spite the price decreasing effects due to the company’s presence and its 
strategic location in low-income area, the company’s presence would increase the likelihood 
of being FI, while the presence of traditional outlets (grocery and convenience stores) helps 
reducing the likelihood of a household being FI.  Similar patterns of results are obtained in the 
low-income sample (not reported in table form for brevity): the estimated coefficient for 
WMSC is positive (0.0188) and significant at the 10% level, the coefficients for SMALL and 
GROC are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level (the estimated coefficients are, 
respectively, -0.1619 and -0.0165), while that of GSCNV is, again, negative and not 
statistically significant (-0.0299).  
Before assessing in detail the endogeneity bias of the results, it should be noted that the 
estimated coefficients for the different demographics used in the model are mostly consistent 
with the characteristics of FI households highlighted in other studies (see for example 
Daponte and Stephens, 2004; Bartfeld and Dunifon, 2006; Nord et al. 2004, Nord et al. 2010). 
Furthermore, sign, magnitude and overall significance of the estimates is largely unaffected 
by the use of different food access measures.  The factors affecting the likelihood of being FI 
in a negative and statistically significant way are: age of the household head, household head 
being male, higher levels of education in the household (in particular the COLMOR and 
SOMCOL dummies), the predicted average income of a household member,
21 and house 
ownership of a home.  Factors showing instead a positive relationship with the likelihood of 
                                                
21 Models including a household aggregate income indicators, as well as a full set of dummies 
capturing all the income brackets were also estimated. In both cases the Pseudo R-squared 
increased but the significance of most of the household-level variables decreased largely. The 
results from these different specifications of the model are excluded for brevity but are 
available upon requests.    18 
being FI are single head households, Asian and Black ethnicities of the head, living in a 
single-unit household, number of children in the household, as well as the presence of 
unemployed and non-citizens in the household.  
Table 4 reports the OL/2-SRI estimates of the equation (7), which accounts for 
endogeneity bias, along with the results of the tests for the validity of the instruments  
performed on the GMM results using Rasch scores (full-sample only).
22  The results of 
Hansen’s J test show that the hortogonality condition is only satisfied in one case, as three out 
o for of the p-values are below the 0.1 customary rejection thresholds, (the p-values are, 
respectively, 0.058 for the model including WMSC, 0.5421 for SMALL, 0.0011 for GSCNV, 
and 0.0228 for GROC).  The F-statistics for the joint significance of the instruments are large 
enough to ensure that the instruments are not weak (in all cases the values exceed the rule of 
thumb of 10 set by Staiger and Stock, 1997).  In sum, the results of the 2SRI models 
discussed below could still be biased in the same direction as the OL ones. 
The values presented in Table 4 show that the residuals from the first-stage regressions 
of the FA variables are statistically significant for three out of four variables considered; in 
detail, the estimates of the FA coefficients for WMSC, SMALL and GSCNV in table 3 were 
all likely to be biased; in spite of the coefficient for the residual of GROC not being 
statistically significant, the p-value associated with the Sargan C was 0.0001 which suggests 
enedogeneity bias. The coefficient of WMSC switches sign, becoming negative (-0.0428) but 
not statistically significant, while the negative coefficient for SMALL is statistically 
significant and show a magnitude 90% larger than the OL estimate (-0.2378).  Interestingly, 
the sign of both GSCNV and GROG coefficients switch from negative to positive, although 
the second is not statistically significant. In particular, a higher concentration of gas stations 
                                                
22 The endogeneity of the FA variables was detected using Rasch scores as dependent 
variables, estimated via GMM, by means of C statistics, obtained as difference of two Sargan 
statistics (Hayashi, 2000, pg. 232). The results of these tests (as well as detailed results of the 
GMM regressions across samples and FI indicators) are omitted for brevity, unless 
specifically needed.    19 
with convenience stores shows a positive association with the likelihood of a household 
showing positive values of FI-12m, the estimated coefficient being 0.2470 and statistically 
significant that the 1% level.  These results suggest that store proximity, more than 
assortment, may be a key component in improving the likelihood of being FS, as a larger 
presence of stores which are usually characterized by ease of access (SMALL) seems to 
reduce the likelihood of being FI, while that of stores which are harder to reach (GSCNV) 
seem to increase such likelihood.  It should also be noted that the inclusion of the instruments 
for the first stage regressions does not affect the performance of the model (the values of the 
Pseudo R
2 are unchanged) and the behavior of the estimated parameters associated with the 
households’ characteristics, resemble closely those in table 3.  
Before illustrating the actual impact of FA on the likelihood of being FI -- i.e. the 
marginal effects of the FA variables in the likelihood of experiencing LFS and VLFS -- the 
detailed results of equation (7) estimated using WMSC as FA variable across the different 
subsamples (Full and Low-inc) and FI indicators (FI-12m and FI-30d), which are presented in 
table 5 are discussed.  The estimated parameters show that, in the case of WMSC, a higher 
concentration of the company’s stores is negatively, although weakly, associated with FI, with 
a statistically significant coefficient (at the 10% level) only for FI-30d indicator and the low-
income household’s sample.  Also, the estimated coefficients arte larger in the Low-Inc 
sample, although the lack of significance of both the coefficients obtained for the Full sample  
(the estimated coefficients are -0.0239, F1-12m/Full; -0.0348 FI-12m/Low-Inc; -0.0204, FI-
30d/Full; all of them not statistically significant, and -0.0490, FI-30d/Low-inc).  These results 
suggest that the presence of a higher density of the company’s stores could be beneficial to 
reduce the risk of experiencing FI among low-income individuals, however such effect is 
weak and only limited to recent occurrences, indicating that the expected combined effects of 
low prices and strategic location in underserved areas may be mitigated by the need for 
transportation to reach the stores.    20 
Some changes in estimated coefficients of the demographic variables indicate that the 
demographic profile of FI households can be different across FI definitions and samples.  In 
particular, the role of most demographic indicators is weakened among low-income 
household, in particular, age of the household head, some of the ethnic profile, secondary 
education, being a single unit household and the presence of non-citizens in the household. It 
should also be noted that the coefficients of the income indicator lose statistical significance 
and in one occurrence show perverse sign while being statistically significant at the 10% level 
(only occurrence among the 16 estimated models is WMSC model using the FI-12m indicator 
as dependent variable).  
 
4.2 Marginal Effects 
Table 6 presents a summary of the OL/2SRI estimates of the FA variables across 
samples and measures of FI, along with the respective marginal effects.  The estimated 
marginal effects associated with WMSC indicate that, if the number of supercenters per 
1,000,000 individuals increases by one unit (corresponding to approximately a 35% increases 
in number of stores) on average, among low-income households, the likelihood of being food 
insecure during the 30-day period prior to the survey is reduced by -0.52% (the marginal 
effects for the other FI indicators and samples are not discussed since they are not statistically 
significant).  The increase of 1 store per millions of people results in a decrease of 0.26% in 
the likelihood to experience LFS; and an additional - 0.26 % of that of experiencing VLFS.  In 
other words, if the availability of Wal-Mart supercenters was increased by 1 additional unit 
for (approximately) 170,000 people, low-income household would have been 1% less likely 
to be FI in the month prior to the survey.  
The presence of small (proximity) stores seems to have a significant negative effect on 
the likelihood of being FI across measure and samples.  The coefficients vary from -0.1956, 
(FI-12m/Low-Inc sample), and -0.2378 (FI-12m, Full sample).  The marginal effects   21 
associated with this variable indicate that, for a 1-unit increase in small food outlets per 
10,000 individuals (corresponding to doubling their numbers, in the full sample and a 110% 
increase in the Low-Inc sample) household would have experienced (on average) a 1.8% 
increase in the likelihood of being FS during the last 12-months  (1.14% of the likelihood of 
being LFS and an additional -0.66% of that of being VLFS), effect which increases to  -3.66 
% for the Low-Inc sample (-2.11% of LFS and an additional -1.55% of that of being VLFS).  
Considering instead FI-30d, the marginal increases in the likelihood of being FS obtained for 
the full and low-income samples are 0.79 % and 2.41% respectively.  In sum, these results 
indicate that increasing the number of proximity stores, helps providing access to food to low-
income individuals who would otherwise be underserved, as these households may benefit 
from the advantages coming from easy to reach locations.    
The estimated coefficients for GSCNV show that the presence of this outlet plays a 
worsening role in determining the likelihood of being FI, effect which is particularly marked 
among low-income households.  The marginal effects associated with GSCNV indicate that, 
for a 1-unit increase in gas stations with convenience stores per 100,000 individuals (i.e., 
approximately, a 55% increase) would have caused a decrease in the likelihood of being food 
secure during the past year equal to 1.87% decrease (the likelihood of experiencing LFS and 
VLFS are 1.18% and an additional 0.69%, respectively) which amounts to -5.34% among 
low-income households (the likelihood of experiencing LFS goes up by 3.08 %, while an 
additional 2.25% is recorder for that of being VLFS).  A similar effect, although more modest 
in magnitude is also obtained on the likelihood that households were FS in the 30 day period 
prior to the survey: the marginal effects would have been that of  an average 1.08% decreased 
in the likelihood of being FS (+0.56% of the likelihood of being LFS and an additional 
+0.53% of that of being VLFS), effect which increases to  +2.99 % for the Low-Inc sample 
(for an increase of 1.5% the likelihood of being LFS and an additional 1.50% of that of being 
VLFS).   These results indicate that as the location of these stores may not be convenient, and   22 
that as higher price and lower quality could be associated with these outlets, their presence 
may cause an increase in the likelihood of being FI.  In other words, an increase in the 
presence   of this outlet could create both direct (prices and travel) and indirect (necessity to 
go to other outlets to complete their food basket) costs on households, leading to a decrease in 
the likelihood of being FS.  Lastly, the effect of GROC on the likelihood of being FI, is 
statistically significant only in one instance, for FI-12m, low-income sample, showing a 
positive coefficient of 0.0871, associated with a  marginal decreasing effect of the likelihood 
of being FS of 1.63%, for an approximate increase of the number of these stores by 19%.  A 
combination of higher prices and perhaps access which requires a means of transportation 
may be at the source of this effect.  
In sum, focusing the attention on low-income households only, larger presence of 
stores which are easily accessible (small grocery and convenience stores) and, in a much more 
modest measure, of stores offering a higher variety of low priced foods (for which lower 
prices offset travel costs), are the only two alternatives likely to mitigate the risk of being FI.  
Higher concentrations of stores that offer limited assortment, and hard to access location (gas-
convenience stores) is instead associated with higher likelihoods of experiencing food 
insecurity, with some modest magnifying effect also coming from traditional large retailers 
(grocery stores).  
 
5  Concluding remarks 
The preliminary results presented in this paper show that the presence of different food 
stores has a role in impacting the likelihood of households’ food security status.  In particular, 
as one considers different income levels, only the presence of proximity stores (small grocery 
and convenience stores) and, at a much more limited extent low-priced alternatives (Wal-Mart 
supercenters) seem to play an effective role to alleviate this issue.  In contrast, the presence of 
hard food outlets, which may offer limited assortments, hard to reach location (and perhaps   23 
higher prices) may jeopardize food security.  We find also limited evidence of medium and 
large grocery stores to have a weak impact on worsening the likelihood of being food secure.  
Future efforts will focus on refining our identification strategy for the FA variables, 
trying to include more variations in the instruments used as to avoid issues of 
multicollinearity and include more than one FA variable in the model simultaneously.   
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Table 1. FI Indicators and Food Access Variables: Descriptive Statistics across samples.   
Variable  Full Sample  Low-Income Sample 
    % FS  % LFS  %VLFS      % FS  % LFS  %VLFS 
FI-12m    90.49  6.48  3.03      72.60  18.45  8.96 
FI-30d    95.65  2.36  2.00      87.39  6.86  5.74 
 
  Mean  St. Err  Min  Max    Mean  St. Err  Min  Max 
WMSC  2.65  4.93  0.00  30.06    3.04  5.23  0.00  30.06 
SMALL   0.97  0.98  0.01  4.86    0.90  0.94  0.01  4.86 
GSCNV  1.83  2.39  0.04  17.08    1.86  2.46  0.04  17.08 
GROC  5.16  7.44  0.04  54.49    5.12  8.69  0.04  54.49 
Legend and data sources:  
FI-12m:   12-month general-scale FI status (0=FS; 1=LFS; 2=VLFS). Source:  CPS-FSS 
FI-30d :    30-day general-scale FI status: (0=FS; 1=LFS; 2=VLFS). Source:  CPS-FSS 
WMSC:    Number of WM Supercenters/ 1,000,000 population. Source: CBP / PEP 
GSCNV:  Number of NAICS 447110 Stores /100,000 population. Source: Holmes(2010)   
        Database / PEP 
SMALL:  Number of NAICS 445120+NAICS 445110 stores <50 employees /10,000  
     Population. Source: CBP / PEP 
GROC:    Number of NAICS 445110 stores >=50 employees /100,000 population. Source:  
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Table 2. Demographic Control Variables, Instruments and Sources  
Variable  Description  Full Sample  LowInc Sample 
    Mean  St.dev.  Mean  St.dev. 
Demographic variables – Continuous           
AGE  Age of Household Head  43.07  12.38  38.95  13.16 
INC_PR  Estimated Average Income of a 
Household Member   26.79  15.34  15.14    10.49 
CHILD  Number of children in household<18 year  0.72  1.06  1.17  1.33 
Control Variables - Discrete  Frequency of 1 
GEND  Head is Male    57.13    47.87 
HIGHSC  Max Educational Attainment: High school    24.84    36.56 
SOMCOL  Max Educational Attainment: Some 
College    29.87    29.40 
COLMOR  Max Educational Attainment College 
Degree or Higher    37.82    12.91 
ASIAN  Race is Asian Household Head    3.55    3.35 
BLACK  Race is Black Household Head    10.62    18.29 
HISP  Hispanic Ethnicity Household Head    10.71    25.94 
HMOWN  Own living quarters (for household)    70.15    41.82 
SINGLEH  Single Head Household    16.38    32.31 
SINGLUN  Single Unit household    29.28    28.50 
NOCITIZ  Non-citizen in household    12.27    24.39 
UNEMPL  Unemployed in household    5.88    10.24 
DISABL  Disabled in the household    0.49    0.80 
FA Instruments         
distFDC  Inverse of distance from WM food 
distribution centers  9.53  14.93  9.12  15.09 
Ndslag  Lagged density of WM DSs / 1,000,000 
population 
3.18   4.35   2.96   4.24  
pop07_sqmi  Population density (.000/square mile)  16.88   45.27   13.19   40.28  
Vacden  Number of vacant units/total square miles  18.01   17.65   16.90   17.68  
Fedhw50sec  Length of Federal Aid highway - 
secondary system (1950) 
9.39   6.43   9.75   6.31  
Fedhw50urb  Length of Federal Aid highway - urban 
system  (1950) 
0.47   0.38   0.47   0.37  
P_gas  State-level refiner gasoline price ($/gal)  1.59   0.20   1.50   0.21  
P_diesel  Area-level diesel price (On-Highway) All 
Types ($/gal) 
2.15   0.31   2.14   0.31  
P_elect  State-level retail electricty price, 
commercial use (c/kWh) 
8.56  2.21   8.50   2.19  
tax_corp  Corporate tax rate for the highest net 
income level 
0.06   0.03   0.06   0.03  
tax_min  Corporate tax rate for the lowest net 
income level 
0.07   0.03   0.06   0.03  
Note: all the demographic variables come from the CPS-FSS  32 
Table 3. Ordered Logit estimates of equation (3), FI-12m; Full sample  
FA Variable  WMSC      SMALL      GSCNV      GROC   
FA  0.0150  *    -0.1255  ***    -0.0241       -0.0137  *** 
   (0.0080)      (0.0330)      (0.0178)      (0.0052)   
AGE  -0.0043  **    -0.0042  **    -0.0043  **    -0.0043  ** 
   (0.0018)      (0.0018)      (0.0018)      (0.0018)   
GEND  -0.3481  ***    -0.3469  ***    -0.3467  ***    -0.3463  *** 
   (0.0410)      (0.0410)      (0.0410)      (0.0410)   
HIGHSC  -0.2241  ***    -0.2268)  ***    -0.2236  ***    -0.2244  *** 
  (0.0625)      (0.0626)      (0.0625)      (0.0625)   
SOMCOL  -0.2197  ***    -0.2252  ***    -0.2205  ***    -0.2227  *** 
  (0.0651)      (0.0652)      (0.0651)      (0.0651)   
COLMOR  -1.0495  ***    -1.0594  ***    -1.0519  ***    -1.0558  *** 
   (0.0882)      (0.0883)      (0.0882)      (0.0882)   
HISP  -0.2922  **    -0.2837  **    -0.2912  **    -0.2890  ** 
   (0.1287)      (0.1288)      (0.1287)      (0.1287)   
ASIAN  0.3280  ***    0.3448  ***    0.3316  ***    0.3363  *** 
   (0.0543)      (0.0546)      (0.0544)      (0.0545)   
BLACK  0.3656  **    0.3715  **    0.3764  **    0.3750  ** 
   (0.1850)      (0.1850)      (0.1849)      (0.1849)   
HMOWN  -0.8953  ***    -0.8978  ***    -0.8941  ***    -0.8946  *** 
   (0.0443)      (0.0443)      (0.0443)      (0.0443)   
INC_PR  -0.0193  ***    -0.0185  ***    -0.0192  ***    -0.0189  *** 
   (0.0029)      (0.0029)      (0.0029)      (0.0029)   
SINGLEH  0.6876  ***    0.6928  ***    0.6884  ***    0.6906  *** 
   (0.0526)      (0.0527)      (0.0527)      (0.0527)   
SINGLUN  0.5506  ***    0.5442  ***    0.5494  ***    0.5479  *** 
   (0.0582)      (0.0582)      (0.0582)      (0.0582)   
CHILD  0.2029  ***    0.2052  ***    0.2034  ***    0.2043  *** 
   (0.0211)      (0.0211)      (0.0211)      (0.0211)   
NOCITIZ  0.1563  ***    0.1893  ***    0.1620  ***    0.1712  *** 
   (0.0571)      (0.0577)      (0.0572)      (0.0574)   
UNEMPL  0.5263  ***    0.5254  ***    0.5259  ***    0.5256  *** 
   (0.0639)      (0.0639)      (0.0638)      (0.0639)   
DISABL  0.3303       0.3215       0.3304       0.3262    
   (0.2164)      (0.2167)      (0.2165)      (0.2166)   
δ1  1.3288  ***    1.2731  ***    1.2782  ***    1.2763  *** 
   (0.1706)      (0.1704)      (0.1714)      (0.1706)   
δ2  2.6466  ***    2.5916  ***    2.5959  ***    2.5943  *** 
   (0.1724)      (0.1722)      (0.1732)      (0.1723)   
Pseudo-R
2  0.1298      0.1302      0.1298      0.1299   
L-ratioχ
2
(65)  3,577.07      3,588.00      3,575.39      3,580.33   
p-values  0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000   
Note: *, **, and *** represent 10, 5 and 1% significance levels – Standard errors in 
parenthesis. State–level fixed effects coefficients omitted for brevity.   
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Table 4. Ordered Logit/2SRI estimates FI-12m, full samples 
FAVariable  WMSC      SMALL      GSCNV      GROC   
FA  -0.0239        -0.2378  ***     0.2470  ***     0.0309    
   (0.0170)       (0.0741)       (0.0876)       (0.0367)   
FA-RES  0.0489  ***    0.1502  *    -0.2663  ***    -0.0453    
   (0.0187)      (0.0954)      (0.0842)      (0.0365)   
AGE  -0.0042  **     -0.0041  **     -0.0041  **     -0.0042  ** 
   (0.0018)       (0.0018)       (0.0018)       (0.0018)   
GEND  -0.3524  ***     -0.3523  ***     -0.3520  ***     -0.3501  *** 
   (0.0410)       (0.0410)       (0.0410)       (0.0410)   
HIGHSC  -0.2077  ***     -0.2071  ***     -0.2073  ***     -0.2060  *** 
   (0.0632)       (0.0633)       (0.0633)       (0.0633)   
SOMCOL  -0.2039  ***     -0.2038  ***     -0.2025  ***     -0.2027  *** 
   (0.0659)       (0.0659)       (0.0659)       (0.0659)   
COLMOR  -1.0420  ***     -1.0458  ***     -1.0418  ***     -1.0421  *** 
   (0.0886)       (0.0887)       (0.0886)       (0.0886)   
HISP  0.1366  **     0.1585  **     0.1509  **     0.1408  ** 
   (0.0636)       (0.0639)       (0.0639)       (0.0637)   
ASIAN  -0.2521  *     -0.2363  *     -0.2381  *     -0.2443  * 
   (0.1302)       (0.1303)       (0.1303)       (0.1303)   
BLACK  0.3557  ***     0.3703  ***     0.3635  ***     0.3590  *** 
   (0.0556)       (0.0558)       (0.0557)       (0.0557)   
HMOWN  -0.8928  ***     -0.8953  ***     -0.8957  ***     -0.8932  *** 
   (0.0443)       (0.0444)       (0.0444)       (0.0444)   
INC_PR  -0.0180  ***     -0.0171  ***     -0.0175  ***     -0.0178  *** 
   (0.0029)       (0.0029)       (0.0029)       (0.0029)   
SINGLEH  0.6927  ***     0.6956  ***     0.6934  ***     0.6931  *** 
   (0.0527)       (0.0527)       (0.0527)       (0.0527)   
SINGLUN  0.5505  ***     0.5439  ***     0.5452  ***     0.5471  *** 
   (0.0582)       (0.0582)       (0.0582)       (0.0582)   
CHILD  0.2055  ***     0.2077  ***     0.2068  ***     0.2063  *** 
   (0.0211)       (0.0211)       (0.0211)       (0.0211)   
NOCITIZ  0.1185  *     0.1457  **     0.1374  **     0.1299  ** 
   (0.0609)       (0.0613)       (0.0613)       (0.0611)   
UNEMPL  0.5317  ***     0.5336  ***     0.5332  ***     0.5321  *** 
   (0.0640)       (0.0640)       (0.0640)       (0.0640)   
DISABL  0.3352  ***     0.3360  ***     0.3413  ***     0.3383  *** 
   (0.2164)       (0.2166)       (0.2166)       (0.2165)   
δ1  1.2849  ***     1.2498  ***     1.7468  ***     1.4086  *** 
   (0.1754)       (0.1780)       (0.2196)       (0.1866)   
δ2  2.6030  ***     2.5684  ***     3.0652  ***     2.7267  *** 
   (0.1771)       (0.1797)       (0.2211)       (0.1883)   
Pseudo-R
2  0.1301        0.1303       0.1301        0.1300    
L-ratioχ
2
(66)  3584.33        3592.37       3585.46        3582.52    
p-values  0.0000        0.0000       0.0000         0.0000     
Hansen J  χ
2
(1)=1.234      χ
2
(4)=3.09      χ
2
(3)=6.66      χ
2
(5)=13.1   
p-values  p=0.058      p=0.5421      p=0.0011      p=0.0228   
F-stat(weak)  853.73      8689.78      235.04      581.57   
Note: *, **, and *** represent 10, 5 and 1% significance levels – Standard errors in 
parenthesis.  State–level fixed effects coefficients are omitted.     34 
Table 5. Ordered Logit/2SRI: FI-12m and FI-30d; Full and Low-Inc samples – Wal-Mart SCs 
Indicator;   FI-12m    FI-12m    FI-30d  FI-30d 
Sample(size)  Full(36,887)    LowInc(7,487)    Full(36,887)  LowInc(7,487) 
WMSC  -0.0239        -0.0348        -0.0204        -0.0490  * 
   (0.0170)       (0.0235)       (0.0232)       (0.0299)   
WM-RES  0.0489  ***     0.0652  **     0.0388        0.0644  * 
   (0.0187)       (0.0259)       (0.0258)       (0.0339)   
AGE  -0.0042  **     -0.0020        0.0004        0.0018    
   (0.0018)       (0.0024)       (0.0025)       (0.0032)   
GEND  -0.3524  ***     -0.2178  ***     -0.3732  ***     -0.2130  *** 
   (0.0410)       (0.0611)       (0.0579)       (0.0821)   
HIGHSC  -0.2077  ***     -0.1341  *     -0.0976        -0.0352    
   (0.0632)       (0.0759)       (0.0887)       (0.1046)   
SOMCOL  -0.2039  ***     -0.0370        -0.0498        0.0793    
   (0.0659)       (0.0831)       (0.0921)       (0.1128)   
COLMOR  -1.0420  ***     -0.7731  ***     -0.8094  ***     -0.4464  ** 
   (0.0886)       (0.1336)       (0.1259)       (0.1791)   
HISP  0.1366  **     -0.0970        0.0160        -0.2289  ** 
   (0.0636)       (0.0853)       (0.0895)       (0.1162)   
ASIAN  -0.2521  *     -0.2868  *     -0.3487  *     -0.2931    
   (0.1302)       (0.1719)       (0.1950)       (0.2369)   
BLACK  0.3557  ***     0.1604  **     0.1696  **     -0.0182    
   (0.0556)       (0.0765)       (0.0771)       (0.1022)   
HMOWN  -0.8928  ***     -0.5143  ***     -0.8807  ***     -0.5087  *** 
   (0.0443)       (0.0625)       (0.0628)       (0.0855)   
INC_PR  -0.0180  ***     0.0094  *     -0.0243  ***     0.0046    
   (0.0029)       (0.0050)       (0.0041)       (0.0065)   
SINGLEH  0.6927  ***     0.4357  ***     0.6945  ***     0.4075  *** 
   (0.0527)       (0.0752)       (0.0750)       (0.1026)   
SINGLUN  0.5505  ***     -0.0026        0.7140  ***     (0.1436    
   (0.0582)       (0.0898)       (0.0825)       (0.1201)   
CHILD  0.2055  ***     0.1189  ***     0.1330  ***     0.0487    
   (0.0211)       (0.0265)       (0.0297)       (0.0364)   
NOCITIZ  0.1185  *     0.0930        -0.0718        -0.0817    
   (0.0609)       (0.0807)       (0.0880)       (0.1113)   
UNEMPL  0.5317  ***     0.4547  ***     0.6521  ***     0.5244  *** 
   (0.0640)       (0.0831)       (0.0828)       (0.1059)   
DISABL  0.3352  ***     0.3559  ***     0.2296  ***     0.1337  *** 
   (0.2164)       (0.2688)       (0.3024)       (0.3732)   
δ1  1.2849  ***     1.2901  ***     2.0368  ***     1.9024  *** 
   (0.1754)       (0.2615)       (0.2363)       (0.3399)   
δ2  2.6030  ***     2.6928  ***     2.8733  ***     2.7835  *** 
   (0.1771)       (0.2637)       (0.2378)       (0.3417)   
Pseudo-R
2  0.1301        0.0391        0.1073        0.0338    
L-ratioχ
2
(27)  3584.33        441.67        1655.63        235.35    
p-values  0.0000        0.0000         0.0000         0.0000     
Hansen J  χ
2
(1)=1.23       χ
2
(1)=2.69        χ
2
(1)=4.63        χ
2
(1)=1.72    
p-values  p=0.058       p=0.1011        p=0.0315        p=0.1776    
F-stat(weak)  853.73       137.74        853.43        157.74   
Note: *, **, and *** represent 10, 5 and 1% significance levels – Standard errors in 
parenthesis.  State–level fixed effects coefficients are omitted.     35 
Table 6. Estimated Parameters, Marginal Effects of the food access variables on the likelihood 
of being Food Insecure: FI-12m and FI-30d; Full and Low-Inc samples 
Indicator  FI-12m    FI-12m    FI-30d  FI-30d 
Sample(size)  Full(36,887)  LowInc(7,487)    Full(36,887)  LowInc(7,487) 
Estimated Coefficients                     
  WMSC  -0.0239       -0.0348       -0.0204       -0.0490  * 
     (0.0170      (0.0235)      (0.0232)      (0.0299)   
  SMALL  -0.2378  ***    -0.1956  *    -0.2026  **    -0.2267  * 
    (0.0741)      (0.1012)      (0.1031)      (0.1362)   
  GSCNV  0.2470  ***    0.2851  **    0.2773  **    0.2812  * 
     (0.0876)      (0.1248)      (0.1241)      (0.1666)   
  GROC  0.0309       0.0871  *    0.0543       0.0661    
    (0.0367)      (0.0517)      (0.0514)      (0.0691)   
                         
Marginal Effects                     
FI=0  WMSC  0.0018       0.0065       0.0008       0.0052  * 
(FS)     (0.0013)      (0.0044)      (0.0009)      (0.0032)   
  SMALL  0.0180  ***    0.0366  *    0.0079  **    0.0241  * 
    (0.0056)      (0.0189)      (0.0040)      (0.0145)   
  GSCNV  -0.0187  ***    -0.0534  **    -0.0108  **    -0.0299  * 
     (0.0066)      (0.0233)      (0.0049)      (0.0177)   
  GROC  -0.0023       -0.0163  *    -0.0021       -0.0070    
    (0.0028)      (0.0097)      (0.0020)      (0.0073)   
                     
FI=1  WMSC  -0.0011       -0.0038       -0.0004       -0.0026  * 
(LFS)     (0.0008)      (0.0025)      (0.0005)      (0.0016)   
  SMALL  -0.0114  ***    -0.0211  *    -0.0041  *    -0.0120  * 
    (0.0035)      (0.0109)      (0.0021)      (0.0072)   
  GSCNV  0.0118  ***    0.0308  **    0.0056  **    0.0150  * 
     (0.0042)      (0.0135)      (0.0025)      (0.0089)   
  GROC  0.0015       0.0094  *    0.0011       0.0035    
    (0.0018)      (0.0056)      (0.0010)      (0.0037)   
                         
FI=2  WMSC  -0.0007       -0.0028       -0.0004       -0.0026  * 
(VLFS)     (0.0005)      (0.0019)      (0.0004)      (0.0016)   
  SMALL  -0.0066  ***    -0.0155  *    -0.0039  *    -0.0121  * 
    (0.0021)      (0.0080)      (0.0020)      (0.0073)   
  GSCNV  0.0069  ***    0.0225  **    0.0053  **    0.0150  * 
     (0.0024)      (0.0099)      (0.0024)      (0.0089)   
  GROC  0.0009       0.0069  *    0.0010       0.0035    
    (0.0010)      (0.0041)      (0.0010)      (0.0037)   
                         
Note: *, **, and *** represent 10, 5 and 1% significance levels – Standard errors in 
parenthesis.  Marginal Effects are calculated at the sample average of the variables.   
 